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It is common to note that social environment and cultural formation shape mental disor-
ders. The details of this claim are, however, not well understood. The paper takes a look 
at the claim that culture has an impact on psychiatry from the perspective of metaphysics 
and the philosophy of science. Its aim is to offer, in a general fashion, partial explications 
of some significant versions of the thesis that culture and social environment shape 
mental disorders and to highlight some of the consequences social constructionism 
about psychiatry has for psychiatric explanation. In particular, it will be argued that the 
alleged dependence of facts about particular mental disorders and about the second 
order property of being a mental disorder on social facts amounts to a robust form 
of constructivism, whereas the view that clinician–patient interaction is influenced by 
cultural facts is perfectly compatible with an anti-constructivist stance.
Keywords: philosophy of science, explanation in psychology, metaphysics, social construction, psychiatric 
classification
introdUCtion
It is common to note that social environment and cultural formation shape mental disorders. For 
instance, the Surgeon General David Satcher states in the preface to Mental Health: Culture, Race, 
and Ethnicity (Supplement) that
[t]he cultures from which people hail affect all aspects of mental health and illness, includ-
ing the types of stresses they confront, whether they seek help, what types of help they seek, 
what symptoms and concerns they bring to clinical attention, and what types of coping 
styles and social supports they possess. Likewise, the cultures of clinicians and service 
systems influence the nature of mental health services. [(1): preface]
The details of the claim that social or cultural facts or events have a significant or systematic impact 
on mental disorders are, however, not well understood. Some construe it as a purely epistemological 
claim (2), on other occasions it is mentioned without any further explication. For instance, in the 
supplement Mental Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity just quoted, it is stated that
[c]ultural differences in the expression and reporting of distress are well established among 
American Indians and Alaska Natives. These often compromise the ability of assessment 
tools to capture the key signs and symptoms of mental illness […] Words such as “depressed” 
and “anxious” are absent from some American Indian and Alaska Native languages […]. 
Other research has demonstrated that certain DSM diagnoses, such as major depressive 
disorder, do not correspond directly to the categories of illness recognized by some American 
Indians. Thus, evaluating the need for mental health care among American Indians and 
Alaska Natives requires careful clinical inquiry that attends closely to culture. [(1): chapter 4.]
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We will turn to similar examples below. Typically, such claims 
are regarded as articulating versions of social constructivism, as 
opposed to objectivism; authors quickly move from the idea that 
sociocultural environment has an impact on mental disorders 
to constructivist rhetoric. The paper takes a look at the claim 
that culture has an impact on psychiatry from the perspective 
of metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Its aim is to offer, 
in a general fashion, partial explications of versions of social 
constructivism about mental disorders and to show which claims 
regarding a sociocultural influence on mental disorders amount 
to social constructivism, and which claims do not. In particular, 
I will discuss constructivist claims about mental disorders them-
selves, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), about the 
subjective experience, the phenomenology, and symptoms that 
are indicative of a disorder, about the second order property 
of being a mental disorder, instantiated by, for instance, PTSD 
or autism, and about constructivism about aspects of the clini-
cian–patient interaction. It will turn out that social constructivist 
rhetoric, in many cases, does not amount to social constructiv-
ism, properly construed.1
Social constructivism in psychiatry can be tentatively charac-
terized by contrasting it with what one may want to call radical 
objectivism (a view I will use for illustrative purposes only).2 
According to radical objectivism about psychiatry, types of 
mental disorders, and the type mental disorder itself, are just like 
the types the natural sciences deal with, in that they are in some 
sense explanatorily independent of social facts or events.3 Neither 
do facts about mental disorders have to be explained in terms 
of underlying social facts nor should the occurrence of mental 
disorders be explained by reference to social causes, in a sense 
to be specified.4 This is what the dispute between objectivism 
and constructivism is about. Compare events of evaporation of 
water and what they, as such, depend on with events of elections 
and what elections, as such, depend on. Neither do explanations 
of events of evaporation of water in physics or chemistry cite 
social causes nor is the evaporation of water, in these sciences, 
explained in terms of underlying social facts. Although the 
evaporation of water in the ocean may depend on social facts, 
1 Throughout this paper, I will ignore the possible cultural impact on experiments 
in psychiatric research, for two reasons. First, I doubt that it requires special treat-
ment, if constructivism about experiments in psychiatry poses a problem at all. If 
social environment significantly shapes experimentation in psychiatry, it will do so 
in other sciences as well, and for similar reasons. By contrast, the targets of social 
constructivism discussed in this paper are, prima facie, special. Second, I am not 
aware of any form of constructivist rhetoric about experimentation in psychiatry 
that is relevantly distinct from constructivist rhetoric that shows in descriptions of 
patient–clinician interaction.
2 Social facts, whatever these are, are no less objective, in the sense of “real,” than 
non-social ones, on the view endorsed here. It is a distinction inside naturalism. 
Social facts are part of nature in that they depend on natural facts about individual 
brains. This is an articulation of my conviction – most of the points made in the 
paper are compatible with more liberal views.
3 I use the term “types,” in line with the literature, to designate what is signified by 
predicates, not to designate predicates or concepts expressed by predicates.
4 Some such view can be ascribed to Kendell (3) and Boorse (4), at least about the 
second order property of being a mental disorder, a similar view is defended by 
Kendler et al. (5), who admit that social aspects may have an impact on disorders, 
but who assume that mental disorders can be individuated in a way similar to types 
in the natural sciences.
namely, the social causes of global warming, in an explanation of 
what evaporation of water is, we should not cite the social causes 
of actual evaporation of water. By contrast, it seems reasonable to 
assume that elections are to be explained in terms of social causes, 
such as joint decisions to vote, or decisions to hold an election 
by individuals or groups who have a certain social status within 
a society. Moreover, unlike facts about the evaporation of water, 
the fact that the election takes place, facts about how it develops, 
etc., explanatorily depend on other social facts  –  facts about 
actions of individuals that count, in the relevant context, as vot-
ings. Social constructivism about psychiatry assumes that facts 
about mental disorders are, with respect to what they, as such, 
explanatorily depend on, a bit-like facts about elections. Radical 
objectivism assumes that facts about mental disorders are, in this 
respect, more like facts about the evaporation of water. They may 
sometimes be caused by social facts, but this is irrelevant when it 
comes to understanding what they are.
Social constructivism is widespread; in some circles, it may 
even be regarded as trivially true. So, why bother? The aim of this 
paper is not to defend or argue against social constructivism; it 
aims at a clarification of what social constructivism about mental 
disorder consists in, or may consist in. It will turn out that in the 
literature, one can find different versions of social constructivism. 
As these forms of social constructivism are often only implicit, 
part of the work will consist in uncovering some hidden con-
structivist commitments.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section introduces some 
basic elements of social constructivism, including an elaboration 
on the difference between causal and non-causal, or, as I will also 
sometimes say, metaphysical explanation or explanatory depend-
ence.5 The section “Versions of Social Constructivism about 
Psychiatry” sketches, in an abstract way, the various versions of 
social constructivism about psychiatry, and introduces the differ-
ent targets of constructivist claims, such as mental disorders, their 
symptoms, and the property of being a mental disorder. Each of 
the remaining Sections [“Social Constructivism about Mental 
Disorders”, “Social Context, Experience, Phenomenology, and 
Symptoms”, and “Mental Disorder and Social Norms”] deals with 
a particular version of social constructivism about psychiatry. 
Some consequences for psychiatric explanation and, thus, for 
psychiatry as a science are highlighted in the conclusion. Note 
that the conclusions drawn in this paper are somewhat prelimi-
nary, in three respects. First, the way I will present the different 
explications of social constructivism is non-committal as to the 
metaphysical details of social constructivism. From the perspec-
tive of metaphysics, this may appear dissatisfying. But in order to 
pave the way for a more thorough theory of social constructivism 
in psychiatry, we should remain neutral on some of the metaphysi-
cal details. Second, the conclusions drawn below are preliminary 
in that the distinctions discussed here may not exhaust the field. 
I have focused on versions of social constructivism that appear 
to surface within prominent areas in philosophy and psychiatry. 
And although the taxonomy offered here is inspired by systematic 
5 There is a vast literature on the metaphysics of these forms of dependence; for 
introductory texts, see Ref. (6); for recent work on metaphysical dependence and 
explanation, see, for instance, the papers published in Ref. (7).
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considerations about candidate versions of social constructivism, 
I will not offer an argument to the effect that the versions of social 
constructivism discussed below exhaust the field. Finally, each 
of the versions discussed below deserves further attention. The 
paper offers partial explications of versions of social constructiv-
ism. Some aspects will be left out.
Basic tenets of social Constructivism
Social constructivism about psychiatry is opposed to radical 
objectivism. Both claims concern the subject matter of psychiatry, 
the types of objects and the connections psychiatry deals with. 
The present section introduces the conceptual tools of social 
constructivism.
A quick look at social constructivism in other areas of philoso-
phy will offer a more thorough idea of what social constructivism 
about some subject matter consists in. A prominent example that 
has been extensively discussed in the past years (8–11) is social 
constructivism about institutions or institutional facts. Social 
constructivism about institutions holds that institutions (or insti-
tutional facts) depend on specific intentional states of individuals. 
For instance, on this view, the fact that some sea-shell, dollar-bill, 
or coin is money depends on the fact that people collectively 
accept it as money [famously argued by Searle (8, 9)]. This form 
of social constructivism is characterized by its target (facts about 
social institutions, such as money), the relevant facts upon which 
its target is supposed to depend, or the target’s social grounds (in 
this case: facts about collective acceptance), and the relation that 
is supposed to hold between the two – in this case: some form of 
metaphysical dependence.
Here is the second example. Feminist philosophers have 
suggested that in some sense, gender is socially constructed (12, 
13). On one version of this thesis, the idea is that women and 
men become women and men (in at least one significant sense 
of these terms) not due to their hard-wired biological make-up, 
but rather due to social causes, such as among other things, 
shared expectations on the side of caregivers, discursive practices 
(repeatedly marking the distinction between boys and girls/men 
and women), and esthetic practices within a society. Again, this 
form of social constructivism can be characterized in terms of 
its target (the occurrence of gender identities in individuals), the 
alleged grounds of this target (causal influences, such as expecta-
tions and discursive practices), and the connection between the 
two – here, causation.
Versions of social constructivism about psychiatry can be 
characterized in a similar format –  in terms of their target, the 
alleged grounds of the target (I use “ground” for both, causal and 
non-causal grounds), and the relation that is supposed to hold 
between the two. We need to distinguish between two types of 
dependence relations – causal and non-causal dependence. As the 
reader might not be familiar with this distinction, let me illustrate 
the difference by way of some examples. An avalanche that occurs 
due to an earthquake is caused by the latter – and the avalanche 
can be causally explained by reference to the earthquake. When a 
rock hits a window so that the window shatters, the fact that the 
window shatters can be causally explained by reference to the fact 
that to rock hit the window. And when the heating of water leads 
to a transition from liquid to vapor, then the vaporization of water 
can be causally explained in terms of the heating of water. Causal 
explanations involve a temporal component  –  causes precede 
their effects. By contrast, the objects involved in non-causal expla-
nations do not necessarily stand in a temporal successor relation. 
The existence of a forest depends on the existence of trees, and 
that there is a forest can be explained by reference to the presence 
of trees. But the existence of the trees does not cause the forest to 
exist, and the existence of the trees need not precede the existence 
of the forest. The hole in the Swiss cheese depends on the cheese; 
and the existence of the hole can be explained by reference to 
features of the cheese. But it need not be the case that there was, 
first, the cheese and then the hole. On naturalistic accounts of the 
mind, the processing of visual information depends on particular 
physiological processes. These processes underlie the processing 
of visual information, and the latter can be explained in terms 
of the former. But the physiological processes do not cause the 
processing of visual information and need not precede it.
“Because”-statements typically express explanations. Some 
explanations are causal, others are not. When speaking of depend-
ence in what follows I mean explanatory dependence. An intuitive 
understanding of the difference between causal and non-causal 
explanation along these lines, in terms of examples and based 
on the observation that causal explanation essentially involves a 
temporal component non-causal explanation does not require, is 
sufficient for our present purposes. In the present context, non-
causal dependence will sometimes be referred to as “constitution.”
As already indicated, versions of social constructivism may, in 
general, differ with respect to the relation they postulate between 
the social grounds of their targets and these targets. Versions of 
social constructivism fall into two categories – those that credit 
social facts with a relevant causal role for the etiology of the 
given target and those according to which the target non-causally 
depends on social facts. These categories mirror, to some extent, 
the following distinction drawn by Sally Haslanger:
Causal Construction: Something is causally constructed 
iff social factors play a causal role in bringing it into 
existence or, to some substantial extent, in its being the 
way it is.
Constitutive Construction: Something is constitutively 
constructed iff in defining it we must make reference to 
social factors (13, p. 98).6
This distinction applies in the context of theorizing about psy-
chiatry. Consider the claim that some mental disorders depend 
on social norms (we will turn back to this view below, Section 
6 It is worth noting that the claim about causal construction should be interpreted 
as a claim about types, rather than tokens. To return to our example from the 
introduction: the actual evaporation of water in the ocean is caused by social fac-
tors, and the way it proceeds also hinges on these social causes; but evaporation as 
such is independent of social factors; its being actually caused by social factors is 
irrelevant when it comes to understanding what it consists in, namely, some form 
of phase state transition. By contrast, to understand what gender categories consists 
in, social factors that played a role in the causal development of gender identities are 
in fact relevant. Why this is so is a question that transcends the boundaries of the 
present paper; it is a general question regarding classification in the social sciences.
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“Mental Disorder and Social Norms”) – that reference to social 
norms is relevant in an explanation for why a patient suffers from 
a mental disorder. Social norms may have a causal impact on 
the development of disorders, and facts about social norms may 
ground, in the non-causal sense, facts about disorders.
To illustrate, consider Stier’s [(2), p. 28] interpretation of 
Wakefield’s critique of current diagnostic practices in the case of 
anxiety disorders. Wakefield explains the fact that “current crite-
ria allow diagnosis when someone is, say, intensely anxious about 
public speaking in front of strangers” by reference to “American 
society’s high need for people who can engage in occupations 
that require communicating to large groups” [(14), p. 154]. Stier 
appears to suggest that considerations like these reveal that there 
is a “[normative] impact of society on the concept of mental 
disorder” [(2), 28f.]. Although I doubt that Wakefield’s considera-
tions concerning anxiety disorders support any such view,7 let us 
assume that the diagnostic practices, based on a given cultural 
background, in fact, ground facts about anxiety disorders. In this 
spirit, one may come up with an explanation of the following type:
[1] She suffers from anxiety disorder because her 
behavior violates a specific social norm, or shared 
expectation concerning the ability to speak publicly in 
front of strangers.
Taken in isolation, this explanation has two interpretations, 
corresponding to the two versions of social constructivism, a 
causal and a non-causal one. On the former, norm-violation plays 
a causal role in the occurrence of the anxiety disorder; and it may, 
in this respect, be similar to the case of evaporation of water and 
the human causes of global warming. On the latter, a behavioral 
pattern counts as an instance of anxiety disorder (in part), because 
it is an instance of a norm-violation.
Consider the causal reading first. Assume that, for some 
reason, a subject develops a minor anxiety concerning a par-
ticular type of social situation, say, to deliver a speech in front 
of strangers, in a social context where this form of anxiety, and 
the behavioral patterns that go together with it, are conceived of 
as socially awkward, or at least as not fulfilling a shared expecta-
tion. Showing the relevant behavior (say, some form of avoidance 
behavior, or specific behavior while delivering a speech) consti-
tutes a norm violation; people react to the norm violation, thereby 
enforcing the anxiety in the subject – to a degree that it becomes 
pathological. In this case, actual social feedback in response to 
norm violation may trigger a feeling of shame, which, in turn, 
may cause the person to experience distress, which, in turn, may 
cause further deviations from socially expected behavior up to a 
degree that makes the condition pathological. Here, violation of 
7 Stier is, as it seems, not quite right when suggesting that Wakefield thereby sup-
ports the claim that “the cultural setup […] tends to dictate the boundary between 
the normal and the deviant on the basis of the expected values and virtues of its 
members” [(2), p. 28]. Rather, Wakefield’s observation supports the epistemic claim 
that the perceived boundaries between the normal and the deviant are dictated (or 
maybe better: partly influenced) by the cultural setup. Wakefield stresses that there 
is a difference between false diagnostic practices and “social phobia [which is] a 
real disorder in which people can sometimes not engage in the most routine social 
interaction” [(14), p. 154].
social norms plays a causal role for the etiology of the disorder. 
This can easily be seen once we note the temporal component 
involved in the underlying process: first, there was norm violation 
which caused a certain behavior in the audience. The behavior in 
the audience then caused further distress, which, after some time 
and repeated stressful experiences, resulted in the development 
of an anxiety disorder.
On the other interpretation, the explanation does not commit 
one to there being a development from norm-violation to mental 
disorder. This is the interpretation (Stier’s) Wakefield appears to 
have in mind, when claiming that there is a normative impact of 
society on the concept of a mental disorder (on my interpretation: 
that the social norms sometimes determine, in a conceptual or 
metaphysical sense, what is a disorder and what is not). On this 
interpretation, norm-violation (or being disposed to violate certain 
norms) and suffering from anxiety disorder occur synchronically. 
The former partly grounds the latter, or, put differently, the latter 
can be metaphysically explained in terms of the former. There are 
several ways in which one can cash out talk of metaphysical expla-
nation. For instance, one may suggest that the truth of a proposition 
that a person has a mental disorder is explained by a truth about the 
violation of social norms. Or, alternatively, one may want to claim 
that the instantiation of the property of having a mental disorder 
metaphysically depends on the occurrence of norm-violations. 
We need not go into the details here. For our present purposes, 
suffice it to note that there are at least two interpretations of the 
explanation that a person suffers from a mental disorder due to 
some social facts, a causal and a non-causal one, and that whatever 
the correct explication of the non-causal interpretation is, it will 
render the explanation true without any implications concerning 
a possible causal (and, thus, temporal) connection between norm-
violation and having a mental disorder. An understanding of the 
distinction between causal and metaphysical dependence along 
these lines is sufficiently precise for the goals of the present paper. 
Social constructivism may involve both, a causal and a non-causal 
claim concerning the relation between mental disorders and social 
facts. Although this is probably true of most scientific explanation, 
it is worth pointing out that these explanations are, of course, only 
partial explanations; the presence of the explanans phenomenon 
is not fully explained in terms of its social causes or some underly-
ing social facts. Versions of constructivism we will be dealing with 
in what follows are claims about the partial social construction of 
mental disorders. Purely physiological, behavioral, or experien-
tial aspects that are not themselves socially constructed may be 
required to offer a full explanation of the relevant phenomena of 
mental disorders.
Before we turn to the specific versions of social constructiv-
ism about psychiatry  –  shouldn’t we say bit more about what 
makes social constructivism about psychiatry social? Intuitively, 
what depends on shared attitudes (like money), what varies with 
cultural context (like the social status of, say, a widow), or what 
itself essentially depends on a social object (like the property of 
playing in the NBL), is, in a sense, itself a social object. As a social 
object, it requires, at some stage, a sort of construction. There are 
straightforward examples of socially constructed objects; but this 
does not mean that there is a straightforward characterization 
of what social constructivism consists in. Any (at least partly 
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successful) attempt to deliver a general answer to the question 
of what social constructivism is would transcend the boundaries 
of the present paper; but a general answer is not required – the 
theses we will be concerned with here are committed to the social 
dimension of their targets (such as particular mental disorders) in 
a straightforward sense; and we will be able to relate, in passing, 
these cases to intuitive formulations of social constructivism. 
Short reflection on two versions, one might, at first sight, want 
to classify as versions of social constructivism will help to get a 
better understanding of what makes social constructivism about 
psychiatry a version of social constructivism, and it will reveal 
that not all constructivist rhetoric amounts to constructivism as 
opposed to objectivism.
Versions of social Constructivism about 
psychiatry
Social constructivism about psychiatry, as introduced above in 
contrast with radical objectivism, is heavily underdetermined. It is 
underdetermined with respect to its target, it is underdetermined 
with respect to the target’s grounds, and it is underdetermined with 
respect to the relation allegedly holding between the target and 
the target’s grounds. In this section, I will introduce five candidate 
targets for social constructivism about mental disorder: mental 
disorders themselves, the system of symptoms, phenomenology, 
and experience associated with a mental disorder, the second 
order property of being a mental disorder, and articulation of 
experiences and interpretation of utterances in patient–clinician 
interaction. The latter two can be dismissed immediately – they 
invite constructivist rhetoric at best. The candidate targets will 
have an impact on the candidate grounds and the relevant rela-
tion supposedly holding between the two.
Consider a person who has been diagnosed with PTSD and 
is, based on this diagnosis, classified as suffering from a mental 
disorder. This will, on the side of the patient, involve (a) PTSD 
itself, with its specific history, including the etiology or the trigger 
of PTSD, (b) a specific subjective experience and, possibly, a spe-
cific phenomenology, and a set of symptoms that are indicative 
of PTSD. Note that depending on the view one adopts regarding 
the nature of mental disorders, these may ultimately collapse into 
one single target, if the phenomenology, the subjective experience 
and particular symptoms enter the individuating criteria for the 
disorder itself;8 but even if this were the case, talk about symp-
toms, phenomenology, experience, and the disorder would still 
be acceptable. Drawing the terminological distinction appears to 
be innocent.
Furthermore, the classification of PTSD as a mental disorder 
will involve (c) a specific aspect of PTSD in virtue of which it 
8 Let me give just two examples of views according to which symptoms may enter 
the individuating criteria for psychiatric types. If you assume, with Wakefield 
(15), that disorders are harmful dysfunctions, and that whether or not a certain 
psychological condition is harmful or a dysfunction may depend on the symptoms 
it produces, then symptoms may enter the individuating criteria for psychiatric tax-
onomies. You will end up with a similar result if you subscribe to what Murphy calls 
the “neo-Krapelinian picture” according to which “mental illnesses are regularly 
co-occurring clusters of signs and symptoms that doubtless depend on physical 
processes but are not defined or classified in terms of those physical processes” (16).
counts as a mental disorder (rather than, say, a stressful episode 
of minor importance) and becomes clinically relevant. Finally, 
being diagnosed with and treated for PTSD typically requires 
that the patient interact with a clinician. She will (d) express her 
experiences and inner perspective as well as report symptoms in 
a particular way. On the side of the clinician, (e) an interpretation 
of the observed and reported (verbal and non-verbal) behavior of 
the patient is required.
For each of these targets, one can subscribe to the view that it 
is shaped by social facts. We have thus identified five candidate 
targets for social constructivism, all of which may give rise to a 
form of social constructivism about psychiatry, or at least may 
go together with some constructivist rhetoric. And indeed, all of 
these can be found in the literature. Before we turn to the more 
promising candidates for serious versions of social constructiv-
ism, let me briefly comment on the last two alleged targets, and 
corresponding claims concerning the impact of culture and social 
environment. Little reflection will reveal that cultural influence 
on patient–clinician interaction is irrelevant in the context of 
social constructivism about psychiatry, properly construed.
The DSM 5 contains a section “Cultural Formulation,” a 
revised version of what had already been presented in the previ-
ous manual. Its goal is somewhat difficult to identify. It contains 
information on mental disorder in relation to, well, anything cul-
ture, so to speak, beautifully illustrated by the suggested “Overall 
cultural assessment”:
Summarize the implications of the components of the 
cultural formulation identified in earlier sections of 
the Outline for diagnosis and other clinically relevant 
issues or problems as well as appropriate management 
and treatment intervention. (DSM 5, 750)
Information gathered about cultural background – including 
religious background and, possibly, gender identity  –  should 
inform diagnosis, clinician–patient interaction, and intervention. 
One particular reason for an assessment of cultural background 
is that differences in cultural background may cause confusion 
and misunderstandings. So, the manual includes questions that 
aim, in particular, at a clarification of cultural concepts and idioms 
of distress (DSM 5, 758 ff.), some of which concern the way the 
individual or members of the group the individual belongs to ver-
balize a given experience. One contention is, in this context, that 
knowledge of sociocultural background may facilitate access to 
underlying conditions; the idea does not seem to be that cultural 
expression of a disorder forms an integral part of the disorder 
itself (we will turn back to this below, in Section “Social Context, 
Experience, Phenomenology, and Symptoms”).
Does the claim that clinicians should be sensitive the culture-
specific articulations of the underlying disorder constitute a 
version of social constructivism, in any interesting sense? This 
does not seem to be the case. To use an idiom from the natural 
science: some of the data we gather may be difficult to interpret. 
In psychiatry, the data may be difficult to interpret because they, 
first, involve verbal reports, whose real or intended meaning may 
escape the interpreter; and, second, the interpreter may exhibit 
something like a cultural bias, which makes interpretation of data 
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difficult, too. But once properly interpreted, the content of the 
knowledge we acquire need not be knowledge involving cultural 
facts, just because access to such knowledge required reflection 
on cultural background. Let me illustrate the point by way of a 
(fictional) example, building on what one may want to call an 
informed stereotype: assume you enter a shop in Berlin, run by 
locals, say, a bakery. You buy a roll and a cake, adding up to € 2.45. 
You offer a € 20 bill. It may very well happen that the clerk looks 
at you like you’ve insulted him, refuses to take the bill, rolls his 
eyes and says: “Damn, I don’t have any change left!” Interestingly, 
this really does not mean that he does not have any change left. 
It appears to be some form of culturally determined expression 
of what elsewhere would probably have been expressed by some-
thing like: “Excuse me, do you have small change?” To properly 
interpret the utterance, knowledge of the cultural background is 
required. But of course, this does not mean that the fact (that 
there is only little change left) is constituted by these social facts 
knowledge of which is required to interpret the data. Claiming 
that in order to properly interpret the utterance in this context 
you have to take cultural considerations into account, does not 
imply that the content of the knowledge you end up with (if you’re 
successful) is knowledge about social facts.
Analogously, the claim that cultural considerations should play 
a role in clinician-patient interaction has no impact on the subject 
matter of psychiatry. It does have an impact on the practice of 
psychiatry. Data may be culturally determined. But data are not 
what psychiatry is ultimately about. We are mainly interested in 
the commitments of current psychiatry (and parts of philosophy 
of psychiatry) with respect to the relation between psychiatry and 
the natural sciences. The key question is not whether cultural 
differences may pose difficulties in the assessment of whether 
or not an individual suffers from a particular mental disorder. 
The question is, rather, whether the subject matter of psychiatry 
involves social explanations in terms of social facts or causes.
A similar point could be made about the recent trend to take 
cultural considerations into account in the context of health man-
agement [also present in the “Cultural Formulation” in DSM 5, 
see, for instance, questions regarding “expectations for services” 
that may depend on the individual’s cultural background (p. 752)]. 
The Supplement Mental Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity, 
edited by he U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
calls attention to the fact that cultural or racial background may 
have a significant impact on access conditions to mental health 
institutions. Thus, reflection on cultural aspects is of utmost 
importance in the context of psychiatric practice. But this does 
not amount to social constructivism about psychiatry.
The following three sections will introduce explications of 
the thesis that social context and culture shape mental disorder, 
which amount to forms of social constructivism about psychiatry 
in a more demanding sense.
social Constructivism about Mental 
disorders
As noted above, one may subscribe to social constructivism 
concerning mental disorders themselves, such as schizophrenia, 
PTSD, or dissociative identity disorder. Social constructivism 
about mental disorders comes in two radically different forms. 
According to one view, which appears to be a minority view (at 
best), facts about mental disorders are like facts about Searlean 
institutions  –  whether or not someone is, say, an alcoholic 
depends, in a non-causal sense, on attitudes of other people 
according to which that person is an alcoholic. Being regarded as 
an alcoholic makes one an alcoholic. According to the other view, 
at least some mental disorders are individuated by their social 
causes, so that their instantiation non-causally depends on their 
etiology. This makes these disorders social in nature, although it 
remains to be seen whether it amounts to social constructivism, 
properly construed. Let me briefly comment on the first view, and 
then turn, in more detail, to the second.
Constructivist claims in metaphysics often take the following 
form:
[2] F’s are F’s because they are considered/regarded to 
be/experienced as F’s.
A famous instance of this schema is Searle’s claim that “[m]
oney is money because the actual participants in the institution 
regard it as money” [(9), p. 17]. Some formulations in statements 
about the nature of mental disorders allow for a similar reading. 
Pickering, for instance, suggests that:
The relevant features of alcoholism do not, contrary to 
what it demands, exist independently of the category 
into which alcoholism is placed [viz. illness, RvR]. [(17), 
p. 27].
One can interpret this claim as follows: some features of 
alcoholism depend on specific attitudes toward alcoholism 
within a social context – namely, that it is regarded as alcoholism 
[rather than a mere moral weakness (Pickering) or, alternatively, 
as “manly” behavior].9 In their critical discussion of social 
constructivism about mental disorders, Kendler et  al. [(5), p. 
1145] appear to interpret social constructivism in a similar way, 
associating it with Haack’s characterization of a kind that is not 
real, i.e., not “independent of how we believe it to be” [(18), 
132]. I am not entirely sure whether anyone ever held some such 
belief; but it appears that self-declared objectivists often tend to 
credit constructivists with some such view (so that the opponent 
of Kendler et al. would turn out to be a straw-man). One may 
suspect that Foucault accepted this form of constructivism 
(19), although Foucault, in later years, explicitly subscribed to a 
form of causal constructivism that is based on causal effects of 
discursive practices.10 Be that as it may – on this version of social 
constructivism, the targets are categories of mental disorder, the 
grounds of the targets are attitudes or discursive practices that 
9 Pickering distances himself from a social constructivist interpretation of this 
view – he regards the sort of construction involved in the classification of a condi-
tion as a mental illness as non-social. On his conception of social construction, 
social constructivists are wedded to the idea that what is socially constructed “exists 
only in certain cultural or social frames of reference” [(17), p. 98].
10 The relevant power relations involve, according to Foucault, not only attributive 
practices but also causal feedback, for instance, in what he called biopolitics (20).
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involve the psychiatric category itself and attribute it to certain 
people, and the relation is that of non-causal dependence.11
This version of constructivism is not the only form of social 
constructivism regarding mental disorders. Some mental dis-
orders seem to be typically caused by particular social events. 
PTSD is typically caused by experiences such as incarceration as 
a prisoner of war, or traumatic experiences that often have a social 
dimension, such as interpersonal violence or sexual assault.
Being typically brought about by social causes alone does, of 
course, not amount to social constructivism. To see that, consider 
the question of whether it contradicts radical objectivism about 
psychiatry. The radical objectivist may hold that mental disorders 
can be caused by social events, as long as we need not cite the 
social dimension among the relevant causes in an appropriate 
explanation that enables us to fully understand the mental disor-
der we are dealing with. The evaporation of water may often be 
caused by social events. A large part of the evaporation of water 
is currently caused by global warming (or so let us assume for 
the sake of the example). Global warming, in turn, is caused by 
our joint actions. And if global warming has a significant impact 
on the natural evaporation of water on earth, then, currently, the 
evaporation of water on earth is typically caused by social facts. 
However, this does not amount to social constructivism about 
the current evaporation of water – the question of whether or not 
evaporation of water is brought about by social causes is irrelevant 
to our understanding of what evaporation of water consists in. 
Put differently: evaporation of water due to global warming caused 
by social events is not an interesting type in physics or chemistry 
(though it may be an interesting type in the context of politics). 
The radical objectivist about mental disorders will maintain that 
similarly, questions regarding the causes of a disorder are, or 
should be, irrelevant in psychiatry.
However, trauma- and stressor-related disorders are partly 
characterized in terms of their etiology. Consider the general 
characterization of these types of disorder, taken from the DSM 5:
Trauma and stressor-related disorders include disorders 
in which exposure to a traumatic or stressful event is 
listed explicitly as a diagnostic criterion. (DSM 5, 265)
If the diagnostic criteria enter the taxonomy of mental disor-
ders, then there are mental disorders that are partly individuated 
by their etiology. The motivation for this relational characteriza-
tion is straightforward. Different experiences cause different 
11 It appears that on this view, psychiatry, conceived of as a science that deals with 
mental disorders, would rest on a confusion. The objects of psychiatry would turn 
out to be mere chimeras; psychiatry would turn out to be like a version of jurispru-
dence whose self-declared goal was to improve the law by empirical interventions 
on the minds of judges, based on the false assumption that the role judges play in 
the juridical system is determined by features intrinsic to judges themselves, while 
recognizing that typical properties relevant in the legal system are social properties. 
Moreover, the view appears to be at odds with the view that suffering correlates with 
the presence of conditions typically classified as disorders, or better, as (Reviewer 
2) suggested, with the assumption that different types of suffering correlate with 
different types of disorders; so, it seems that there is more to these conditions than 
classification or being regarded as having a mental disorder (although this may 
indeed constitute part of the problem).
subtypes of trauma- or stressor-related disorders, and knowledge 
of the cause may bear on clinical decisions. Often, the traumatic 
or stressful event involves a social dimension. Typical examples 
include experience of war, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of 
war, or sexual abuse. DSM 5 states explicitly that “[t]he disorder 
may be especially severe or long-lasting when the stressor is 
interpersonal and intentional” (DSM 5, 275). Interpersonal and 
intentional stressors involve a social dimension – not because any 
intentional action is social, bur rather because any intentional 
action directed at another person – here: the patient – is social. 
Witnessing a death by accident of a close relative and experienc-
ing a catastrophe such as an anaphylactic shock form the only 
exceptions in the list included in DSM 5, waking during surgery 
forms a borderline case (in this case, it is not clear whether the fact 
that surgeons appear to interfere intentionally with the patient’s 
body plays a relevant explanatory role).
So, the family of trauma- and stressor-related disorders 
involves types of disorders that are, in part, defined in terms of 
the types of causes that actually triggered the disorder. PTSD due 
to traumatic experience during incarceration as a prisoner of 
war is different from PTSD due to traumatic experience caused 
by witnessing an accident involving the loss of a close relative. 
The difference shows at the token level, and it also shows at the 
level of subtypes, subtypes of the type trauma or stressor-related 
disorder, when the type of cause is referred to in a classification 
of the relevant disorder.
But doesn’t such relational individuation of types seem odd? 
Upon reflection, relational classifications are common. On 
most accounts, being an artwork depends on the etiology of 
the artwork  –  namely, being intentionally produced. Similarly, 
being an artifact depends on the etiology of the artifact. And 
individual horses are, on some views, horses in part because they 
are descendants from horses. In the social sciences, relational 
types are common: someone is a president (and not merely, say, 
a warlord), a state (and not merely a territory), or a law (and not 
merely an enforced rule) only if it has a certain history.
Thus, on the view implicit in DSM 5, for some subtypes of 
trauma- or stressor-related disorders, if a person suffers from 
this subtype, she does so because of the specific etiology of the 
disorder. The fact that the disorder has a cause of a particular 
type grounds the fact that it is a disorder of the corresponding 
subtype (for instance, disorder caused by an interpersonal and 
intentional stressor, or PTSD due to torture). Expressed in terms 
of targets, grounds, and the alleged relation between the two: 
the targets are subtypes of trauma- and stressor-related disor-
ders. The grounds are complex events that relevantly involve a 
social dimension, such as intentions directed at other persons, 
interpersonal actions, and social properties, such as being a war 
and being an incarceration, which, moreover, stand in a causal 
relation to the psychological condition classified as a disorder. 
The relation between the social grounds and the occurrences of 
the disorder is, thus, causal. But the relation between the disor-
der and the cause is not merely causal, it is also conceptual, or 
metaphysical: to instantiate one of the subtypes requires that the 
disorder be caused by a particular type of object. The cause not 
only causes the disorder, facts about the cause also ground facts 
about the instantiation of the disorder. This marks the difference 
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between the current evaporation of water, on the one hand, and 
the relevant types of mental disorders, on the other. Whereas, in 
fact, some events are evaporations of water and can be explained 
in terms of social events, causal explanations referring to social 
events are not required for an explanation of why evaporation of 
water is evaporation of water. Suffering from PTSD due to expe-
rience of interpersonal violence, in contrast, requires a specific 
causal history involving a social cause.
On this interpretation, some mental disorders are clearly social 
objects in the sense that they essentially involve a social aspect. 
But does this amount to social constructivism, in a straightfor-
ward sense? It fits Haslanger’s characterization, since in defining 
the subtype “we must make reference to social factors” [(13), p. 
98]. The classification scheme involves types that are individuated 
by, and whose instantiation depends on, the presence of specific 
social features of the causes of the disorder. In some sense, how-
ever, this does not amount to social constructivism: it is not the 
case that forms of PTSD exist in or require for their existence, as 
Pickering put it, “a cultural or social frame of reference” [(17), p. 
98]. Not every social object, such as abusive behavior, or incar-
ceration, is a social construction in this sense. This may speak 
against Haslanger’s characterization or at least require elaboration 
on the notion of a social factor. Ultimately, this may be a verbal 
issue about how we want to use the term “constructivism”; what is 
important in the present context is that this type of classification 
of subtypes of disorders appears to contradict objectivism; in the 
present context, we may, then, group it with more demanding 
versions of social constructivism, discussed in the next sections.12
social Context, experience, 
phenomenology, and symptoms
Let us move from aspects of social construction in classifica-
tion to aspects of social construction involved in experience, 
phenomenology, and symptoms of mental disorders. Whether 
constructivism about experience, phenomenology, or symptoms 
12 Although this is not the topic of the present paper, two possible objectivist 
responses immediately come to mind: Maybe it is not the fact that the cause has 
certain social features, but rather that it is perceived as having these features, which 
is relevant to the type of disorder that we are dealing with. So, if reference to social 
features of causes just roughly catches what really does the explanatory work – that 
the cause is perceived as being of a particular social type – social constructivism 
about these types of disorders appears to be mistaken. Still, it is not entirely clear 
how to cash out, and account for, the relevance of perceived social causes within 
the radical objectivist framework. Second, one could construe this form of social 
constructivism as a form of pragmatic constructivism. Maybe Psychiatry, in its 
current form, is not as good as it gets. The types current psychiatry deals with 
are pragmatically adequate. If, for instance, incarceration as a prisoner of war is 
reliably connected with showing a specific behavioral pattern and being responsive 
to specific treatment, then, given our current epistemic background, individuation 
of subtypes of PTSD with respect to the causes makes perfect sense – for purely 
pragmatic reasons [according to Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary (21) fulfillment of 
some such condition is sufficient to count as a scientific type]. On this view, the 
mechanism underlying the connection between particular causes and particular 
disorders is still missing. Once uncovered, reference to the social cause becomes 
idle. The view that some mental disorders should, at the present stage of develop-
ment of psychiatry, be classified in terms of their social causes is, thus, compatible 
with versions of in-principle reductionism about mental disorders. As a conse-
quence, one may have reservations to group pragmatic constructivism with more 
robust forms of constructivism.
is compatible with robust objectivism depends on whether we 
take these to be constitutive of the disorder.
As we have just seen, the claim that causes of mental disorders 
exhibit social features alone does not amount to any interest-
ing form of social constructivism; a claim about metaphysical 
dependence on social causes was required. This should not come 
as a surprise. Recall the example discussed in Section “Basic 
Tenets of Social Constructivism”:
[1] She suffers from anxiety disorder because her 
behavior violates a specific social norm, or shared 
expectation concerning the ability to speak publicly in 
front of strangers.
On its causal interpretation, according to which causal norms 
played a causal role in the development of the disorder, committing 
to [1] one does not commit to any form of social constructivism. 
The objectivist may maintain that disorders have social causes; 
and the objectivist may consistently hold that cultural variation 
among disorders depends on social causes.
As already mentioned, DSM 5 offers a guide for cultural evalu-
ations in the “Cultural Formulation,” which deals, to a significant 
extent, with problems in the interpretation of verbal reports; but 
it also deals with interpretation of experiences, calling attention 
to the fact that “the cultural constructs … influence how the indi-
vidual experiences […] his or her symptoms or problems […]” 
(DSM 5, 750). As long as the subject’s reports are distinct from the 
underlying disorder, the claim that an adequate interpretation of 
reports requires knowledge about sociocultural background does 
not amount to social constructivism. The same holds for the claim 
that sociocultural background shapes the experience, phenom-
enology, and symptoms of the disorder, as long as these are not 
constitutive of the disorder itself, but, rather, signs of the disorder. 
On this picture, experiences, symptoms, and phenomenology 
may need translation just like reports. But signs of a disorder need 
not play an essential role in scientific classification. As long as the 
disorder manifests at the physiological level, and as long as types 
of disorders can, at least in principle, be individuated in purely 
physiological terms, the objectivist can happily admit that social 
causes have an impact on mental disorders [see, for instance, Ref. 
(5)]. The radical objectivist may even accept that knowledge of 
cultural context is epistemically relevant for clinical practice.
From the objectivist perspective, the connection between 
social causes and the way a disorder manifests may involve causal 
connections at the level of neurodevelopment. Kirmayer and 
Crafa (22) have, in the spirit of social or cultural neuroscience, 
argued that the physiological structure underlying specific condi-
tions is shaped by social causes:
Culture can be seen as providing essential contexts for the 
development and functioning of the brain on multiple 
timescales: through its evolutionary history, which has 
involved brain–culture coevolution; across individual 
lifespans as biographical events are inscribed in circuitry 
by mechanisms of epigenetics and learning; and through 
ongoing influences on neural functioning by specific 
contexts of adaptation and performance. [(22), p. 7]
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Again, this appears to be perfectly compatible with an 
objectivist stance  –  there is no social construction involved, if 
Kirmayer, Crafa, and others are right. Of course, these claims 
raise interesting methodological issues; for instance, if sociocul-
tural background has a significant impact on the development 
of the physiology underlying mental disorders, can we dispense 
with descriptions in terms of sociocultural background, or does 
it provide heuristics that, for the time being, are indispensable in 
clinical contexts? To repeat: epistemic questions of this sort may 
arise even if we adopt objectivism about mental disorders. Unless 
we individuate disorders with respect to sociocultural causes, as 
suggested in DSM 5 for PTSD, we do not end up with a form of 
social constructivism.
If we do, however, we would end up with a very similar form of 
constructivism [as (Reviewer 2) has pointed out]: one may adopt 
the view that experiences, symptoms, or phenomenology are con-
stitutive of a disorder, and that experiences, some symptoms and 
the phenomenology that goes together with a disorder are not 
individuated by their underlying physiology, but, rather, require 
individuation in terms of their social dimension [see Ref. (23–25) 
for a critical perspective]. Thornton (26) has recently pointed out 
that Jaspers (27), in his discussion of psychiatry (for instance, in 
his book “Allgemeine Psychopathologie,” first published in 1913), 
suggested that for a great number of psychological conditions that 
count as a mental disorder, some form of subjective understand-
ing is required, besides observing behavior and understanding 
the other as rational (if possible), for an understanding of the 
kind of disorder the patient suffers from. Thornton tentatively 
agrees that an understanding of phenomenal aspects and subjec-
tive experiences may be required in understanding the nature of 
the disorder.
In a somewhat similar spirit, certain experiences may be 
regarded as forming essential parts of a disorder. Consider the 
following example, taken from Stier’s discussion of cultural vari-
ation in psychiatry:13
A […] striking cultural difference can be found in the 
case of social anxiety. While in the western cultural 
sphere this is connected with the fear of being harmed 
or offended, in Japan and Korea people are in fear of 
harming or offending others […]. [(2), p. 29]
Now, none of these claims makes, all by itself, for social 
constructivism; highlighting the way a disorder is presented to 
a subject from the first person perspective need not go together 
with social constructivism (although it will of course pose dif-
ficulties for forms of naturalism that typically go together with 
the form of objectivism we are concerned with here). However, 
the way a condition is presented to a subject from the first person 
perspective may involve a social dimension. Consider the case of 
variation across cultures in anxiety disorders: the assumption is 
13 Stier uses this example to back up an argument against biologism; it is not 
entirely clear to me how this example may affect even purely epistemic forms of 
reductionism, unless we buy, as a premise, that for biologism to be true, there must 
be one physiological condition underlying both disorders. But this does not seem to 
be required for some form or another of biologism to be true.
that variation should be further explained in terms of cultural 
background, the role an individual is supposed to play within 
a community, the notion of personhood, etc. If we assume that 
the different forms of experience in western and Japanese and 
Korean culture correspond to at least two different subtypes of 
some disorder, subtypes any psychiatric taxonomy should be 
sensitive to, and if we assume that there is no unified physiological 
type corresponding to these experiences, we end up with a robust 
form of social constructivism. In Haslanger’s words: the subtypes 
are “causally constructed” in that “social factors play a causal role 
in bringing [them] into existence or, to some substantial extent, 
in [their] being the way [they are]” [(13), p. 98]. Our objectivist 
would oppose a view according to which genuine social experi-
ences that are not individuated by their physiological basis are 
essential to classification in psychiatry. The targets are disorders, 
and the grounds are experiences, phenomenology, or symptoms 
that are individuated only with respect to a social context. The 
relation is, again, non-causal; the perspective of the individual 
is not causally connected to the disorder; it is constitutive of it.14
So, does no thesis regarding the social cause of mental disor-
ders, all by itself, amount to social constructivism? Is all social 
construction non-causal, as far as psychiatry is concerned?
Consider one particular version of the claim that some dis-
orders have (maybe among others) social causes. It is somewhat 
atypical. Standard versions of social constructivism regarding 
causal influences of the cultural background on phenomenology, 
symptoms, or experiences have it that cultural background does 
not contain any particular “information” on the disorder itself, 
which would explain cultural variation. For instance, the differ-
ence between social anxiety in Europe and some parts of East Asia 
is explained in terms of general differences regarding the concept 
of a person or the expectations regarding the relation between an 
individual and the community it lives in. In contrast, Ian Hacking, 
and, from a psychiatric perspective, Piper and Merskey (28) have 
argued that some mental disorders evolve in response to specific 
theories of disorders, and the expectations that go together with 
specific theories. Hacking writes:
[T]here was usually only one well-defined alter; today, 
sixteen alters is the norm. In France, a century or so ago, 
cases of doubling had the symptoms then associated 
with florid hysteria – partial paralyses, partial anesthe-
sia, intestinal bleeding, restricted field of vision. English 
cases of double consciousness were more restrained but 
regularly went into a trance […]
Times change, and so do people. People in trouble are 
not more constant than anyone else. But there is more to 
the change in the lifestyle of multiples than the passage 
of time. We tend to behave in ways that are expected of 
us, especially by authority figures – doctors, for example. 
Some physicians had multiples among their patients in 
the 1840s, but their picture of the disorder was very 
14 There is, of course, also a relevant causal connection between the phenomenology 
or experience and the social environment of the subject, but this does not appear 
to be constitutive for the disorder.
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different because the doctors’ expectations were differ-
ent. That is an example of a very general phenomenon: 
the looping effect of human kinds. [(29), p. 21]
Hacking’s view is clearly not that there is one type of disorder 
that can be expressed or even experienced in different ways due 
to the different models of the disorder offered in a given social 
environment (such as first multiple personality disorder, then 
dissociative disorder). Rather, the idea is that the discourse in 
psychiatry itself has a causal impact on the disorder the patient 
develops. The discourse causes the individual to adopt the dis-
sociative identity disorder personality. The discourse, including 
expectations and specific norms, functions as an external cause 
of the disorder itself.
Some remarks on the details of Hacking’s account are required 
in order to avoid misunderstandings. Basically, Hacking distin-
guishes between two different types of kinds, indifferent and 
interactive kinds. The former are kin to natural kinds; their objects 
are indifferent to our classification. Interactive kinds, however, 
involve causal feedback mechanisms, where the subjects that 
fall into the extension of an interactive kind respond to the clas-
sification, which, in turn, bears on the classification itself. This 
sort of causal looping effect is visible, according to Hacking, in 
psychiatric classification. But psychiatric classification is not 
purely interactive. According to Hacking, mental disorders 
have a physiological basis, which can be classified in terms of an 
indifferent kind. For what follows, I will be solely concerned with 
Hacking’s characterization of the interactive aspect of psychiatric 
classification.
The target is, again, a particular type of disorder. The grounds 
are social events, involving interaction between patient and clini-
cian or members of the social environment, with certain individual 
or shared expectations. The dependence relation is causal – the 
person is caused to adopt a certain pattern of experiences and 
behavioral traits, which, in turn, may have an impact on the clas-
sification. In contrast with the versions of causal constructivism 
about mental disorders previously discussed, Hacking assumes 
that the very attribution of a disorder contributes to the disorder 
(or the interactive aspect of the disorder). Interestingly, this 
renders true an explanation that looks, at its surface level, very 
much like Searle’s constructivist claim about money:
[3] Some people suffer from dissociative identity 
disorder because others regard them as suffering from 
dissociative identity disorder.
Unlike Searle’s claim about money, however, [3] can be inter-
preted causally (and it is merely a partial explanation). It appears 
that there are causal versions of social constructivism in psychia-
try. It is a form of constructivism not because of cultural variation, 
or because the disorder relates to attitudes like money relates to 
acceptance as money; it is a form of constructivism because it 
credits a conceptual practice, or discourse (that of multiple 
dissociative disorder) with the ability to literally create its own 
objects; and it does so in a way that masks the actual mechanisms 
that underlie the occurrence of multiple dissociative disorder. Of 
course, it is similar to cases where cultural background shapes 
the symptoms; discourse about multiple dissociative disorder 
is part of the cultural background. And if it has an impact on 
the development of dissociative disorders, including behavioral 
patterns, experiences, and symptoms, then in this case, cultural 
background shapes the disorder. But in this particular case, there 
is more: due to the tight connection between cultural background 
and disorder (i.e., the content of the discourse, which determines 
what it is to suffer from multiple dissociative disorder, and the 
disorder itself) the causal looping effect, if it occurs, ensures 
that that the current psychological condition instantiates the 
(first order) properties that define the interactive aspect of the 
disorder. Ignoring feedback mechanisms: The discourse causally 
contributes to the fact that the subject adopts the behavioral pat-
tern others expect the subject to show; and showing the pattern 
is one mark of the disorder. If the interactive aspect of psychiatric 
classification were constitutive for facts about a subject falling 
under the relevant category,15 then the instantiation of the prop-
erty of having dissociative identity disorder would metaphysically 
depend on facts about adaptation to expectations (among other 
facts). In this case, causal construction and metaphysical depend-
ence go together.
Now, finally, let me turn to what may be regarded as the most 
common, and, at the same time, the most challenging version 
of social constructivism regarding psychiatry: the thesis that the 
property of being a mental disorder is itself socially constructed.
Mental disorder and social norms
In the tentative characterization of the notion of a mental disorder 
published in the introductory parts of DSM 5, the authors state 
that “[a]n expectable or culturally approved response to a com-
mon stressor […] is not a mental disorder” (DSM 5, 20). It seems 
that thereby, the authors intend to indicate that something is a 
mental disorder only if it involves responses to stressors that are 
not expectable or culturally approved. This reading is supported 
by the following passage:
The boundaries between normality and pathology vary 
across cultures for specific types of behaviors. Thresholds 
of tolerance for specific symptoms or behaviors differ 
across cultures, social settings, and families. Hence, 
the level at which an experience becomes problematic 
or pathological will differ. The judgment that a given 
behavior is abnormal and requires clinical attention 
depends on cultural norms that are internalized by the 
individual and applied by others around them, includ-
ing family members and clinicians (DSM V, 14)
In contrast with the issues raised under the heading “Cultural 
Formulation,” this is clearly more than a purely epistemological 
15 Tsou (30) has argued that if Hacking is right, then a stable classification of mental 
disorders in terms of the indifferent “part” of the classification should be possible. 
Here, we are not so much concerned with what Hacking actually claims; rather, 
we can, based on the work of Hacking, identify one possible version of social 
constructivism about mental kinds, a version of social constructivism that captures 
the interactive “part” of psychiatric classification.
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point about access conditions. The authors suggest that whether 
or not a problematic experience is pathological depends in part 
on the social or cultural context. This idea has played a prominent 
role in the anti-psychiatrist movement (31), and the question of 
whether normative aspects involved in diagnostic procedures are 
social or can be cashed out in, say, descriptive or biological termi-
nology has attracted considerable attention (3, 4, 26, 32). Being a 
mental disorder is a second order property, in the sense that it is 
supposed to be instantiated by first order properties of psychologi-
cal conditions. An alcoholic exemplifies a specific psychological 
property, which, in turn, is supposed to exemplify the property 
of being a mental disorder.16 The significance of the property of 
being a mental disorder appears to stem from the fact that it dis-
tinguishes the clinically relevant from the clinically irrelevant (just 
like related concepts of health and illness). Social constructivism 
about this second order property states that whether or not it is 
exemplified by a first order psychological condition depends on 
the social norms within a society. The boundaries between the 
pathological and the non-pathological determine whether or not 
a condition is a mental disorder, and they are themselves partly 
determined by social norms. Very roughly, social norms are 
usually regarded as a particular type of expectations about the 
behavior of others (33, 34); individuals are expected to follow a 
norm and are expected to act in a certain way when they detect 
norm-violation. Only if some such structure is widespread among 
a society, a social norm is in place. Facts about social norms are 
clearly social facts. Consequently, this form of social constructiv-
ism maintains that facts about the second order property being a 
mental disorder (the target of this form of social constructivism) 
depend on social facts, such as the presence of social norms, and 
that the relation between the two is non-causal dependence – the 
social norms do not cause a condition to be a mental disorder; they 
determine, in a conceptual, or logical sense whether or not some 
condition counts as a mental disorder.17 Here, in a straightforward 
sense, instantiation of the second order property of being a mental 
disorder requires a certain conceptual framework; and it is shared 
attitudes that ground the instantiation of the property.
ConCLUsion
Let me sum up the results. Versions of social constructivism 
come in three different forms. Their targets are (some or all) 
types of mental disorders, or the second order property of being 
a mental disorder. Social facts and events appear among the 
grounds of mental disorders, and social norms or expectations 
16 In a derivative sense, individuals instantiate the property of having a mental 
disorder, namely, when they instantiate a first order property (such as alcoholism), 
which exemplifies the second order property of being a mental disorder.
17 Although Wakefield departs from a biological notion of dysfunction, he arrives 
at a similar form of social constructivism. Wakefield characterizes the concept of a 
disorder in terms of a “condition [that] causes some harm or deprivation of benefit 
to the person as judged by the standards of the person’s culture” – what he calls 
the “value criterion” [(15), p. 385], which complements the biologically construed 
dysfunction condition for the presence of a mental disorder. Wakefield assumes 
that disorders require biological dysfunction, but that what counts as a normal or 
acceptable life depends on social or cultural context.
shape the boundaries of the second order property of being a 
mental disorder. It may even be the case that sometimes, psy-
chiatric classification itself has an impact on the occurrence of 
its objects, as Hacking suggests. Note that apart from versions of 
social constructivism about the second order property of being a 
mental disorder, social constructivism about psychiatry may, and 
probably will be limited to some forms of mental disorders. What 
is true of trauma or stressor-related disorders need not be true of 
schizophrenia, or, in particular, neurodevelopmental disorders.
So, what’s the consequence of social constructivism for psy-
chiatry as a science? It is difficult to give a straightforward answer. 
Quite a bit will hinge on general considerations about reduction, 
about the nature of scientific kinds, and on the nature of explana-
tion. In order to bypass these further questions, let me begin with 
an observation that immediately follows from the different ver-
sions of social constructivism described above: if social construc-
tivism about psychiatry is true, in one of the versions described 
above, then the conceptual apparatus psychiatry employs involves 
concepts of social objects, events, or facts. Moreover, it credits  the 
so-represented events, objects, or facts with an explanatory role, 
in causal as well as metaphysical respects. Causal explanations in 
terms of social causes would turn out to be genuine and indispen-
sable explanations within psychiatry – indispensable in the sense 
that the psychiatric types are partly social in nature. Although 
the radical objectivist may accept that some causal explanations 
of the occurrences of mental disorders that cite social events as 
causes are true, or may even play a useful heuristic role, she will 
deny that such explanations figure among the set of psychiatric 
explanations, properly construed. Recall: the evaporation of 
water from the Ocean may be caused by global warming, which, 
in turn, may be caused by social events. But an explanation of the 
evaporation of water from the Ocean based on its social causes 
will not count as an explanation within physics. Similarly, on the 
objectivist view, the explanation of mental disorders in terms of 
social causes will not count as a psychiatric explanation. Social 
constructivism, in some of its versions, is bound to deny that. 
Parts of psychiatry would then move toward the social sciences, 
as far as their explanatory practices are concerned.
Now, there is no consensus as to how we should conceive 
of scientific explanation, especially in the social sciences. One 
may take a liberal stance, suggesting that type construction 
and explanation mainly serve heuristic purposes, that causal 
generalizations merely systematize observations, and that conse-
quently, the metaphor of the sociocultural environment shaping 
mental disorders can be given a non-committal, pragmatic, 
or purely epistemic interpretation. If so, the commitments of 
social constructivism are relatively weak; and dispute between 
constructivism and objectivism would be a dispute not about the 
nature, but rather about the pragmatically adequate or epistemi-
cally beneficial conceptualization of mental disorders. Some such 
considerations may have played a role in the history of DSM – the 
question of where to invest time and money may, by and large, be 
decided on pragmatic grounds.
But there is a corresponding ontic distinction that seems to 
better fit the nature of the dispute between constructivists and 
objectivists. The constructivist raises the worry that objectivism 
will fail for principled reasons; it just does not get the metaphysics 
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right and, hence, looking for mechanisms or genetic profiles alone 
will never deliver the desired results. Rather, we should take social 
background, etiology, and cultural formation into account. And 
the objectivist maintains that at best, considerations regarding the 
sociocultural environment may play a heuristic role, or constitute 
an obstacle in the appropriate translation from behavioral obser-
vation and the subjects’ reports to the language of the underlying 
neural mechanisms.
Social constructivism, on its metaphysical interpretation, may 
have ramifications that go beyond issues that pertain to the meta-
physics of science in the narrow sense. Some versions of social 
constructivism, concerning, for instance, gender or race catego-
ries, have been proposed not as a challenging exercise in theoreti-
cal metaphysics, but rather with a critical intention. Very roughly, 
the critique, whatever the details, departs from the observation 
that what seems to be a distinction, or is typically regarded as a 
distinction grounded in natural properties, in reality is a distinc-
tion imposed on the world by us, to a relevant degree. If true, this 
may have significant political and ethical ramifications – whether 
a status is natural or social bears on normative considerations. 
Revealing the hidden social nature of an allegedly natural cat-
egory may then constitute a first step in a critical enterprise [for 
an explication of the idea of how social constructivisms relates 
to the critique of current practices, cf. Ref. (35)]. Uncovering the 
social nature of gender categories is important not only for gen-
eral metaphysical purposes but also, and primarily, for political 
reasons. The idea is that if what appears to be natural turns out to 
be social, evaluative, and political practice should change.
We cannot go into the details here; but one may expect that 
similar critical or ameliorative projects will be relevant in the 
philosophy of psychiatry whenever evaluations based on the 
classification of people as having a mental disorder hinge on an 
objectivist interpretation of the property of having a mental dis-
order, where, in fact, having a mental disorder depends on social 
facts. If social norms determine whether or not a psychological 
condition belongs to the category of having a mental disorder, 
and if being classified as having a mental disorder forms the basis 
of unjust treatment by others because these others mistakenly 
believe the property of having a mental disorder to be natural, 
or objective, then uncovering the social nature of the property 
of being a mental disorder may bear on social practice. This is 
precisely what Szasz intended.
Let me close with a related observation regarding the distinc-
tion between objectivists and constructivists in psychiatry. As 
(Reviewer 2) has stressed, variation in the occurrence of a type 
depending on sociocultural background (such as the occurrence 
of specific gender identities) is often regarded as an indication of 
the fact that the occurrence of this type depends on social facts; 
social constructivism has been the theory of choice to account for 
such facts. Recall Hacking’s theory about the construction of dis-
sociative identity disorders. Cultural variation is, here, clearly an 
indicator for the dependence of dissociative identity disorder on 
social facts. It is an indicator of the latter; but does cultural varia-
tion alone support some  form or another of social constructivism?
Above, I have suggested that cultural variation in mental 
disorders is compatible with the form of objectivism discussed 
here. Doesn’t this show that the way I use the term “objectivist,” 
and, hence, “constructivist,” is at odds with at least one important 
use of these terms in the general debate on social constructiv-
ism? Here, I can merely gesture at an answer. I think that there 
is a difference between the pair “constructivist”/“objectivist” in 
the context of debates about first order mental disorders and, 
say, in the field of gender theory. This is not an accident; it is 
mainly due to the fact that the type of objectivism opposed, for 
instance, by feminist constructivists just lacks a counterpart in 
the sphere of psychiatry, because gender categories differ from 
categories of (first order) mental disorders in one important 
respect. Simplifying a lot, conceptualization in terms of gender 
will typically go together with an implicit naturalist conception 
of gender properties (sometimes described as essentialization). 
Consequently, the gender-objectivist believes gender to be part 
of the nature of an individual; being a woman is supposed to be 
inborn, deviations from the dichotomy are regarded as, well, non-
natural and, possibly, requiring intervention. These issues simply 
do not arise in current day psychiatry. Conceptualizing someone 
as suffering from a disorder does not suggest a conceptualization 
of the person as having this property by nature.
In the context of psychiatry, naturalist or essentialist objec-
tivism typically concerns the second order property of being a 
mental disorder; objectivists claim that it is a natural or essential 
property of (first order) psychological conditions, whereas 
constructivists maintain that classification of first order psycho-
logical conditions as a mental disorder comprises an element of 
construction.
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